Many ad hoc routing algorithms rely on broadcast flooding for location discovery or, more generally, for secure routing applications. Flooding is a robust algorithm but because of its extreme redundancy, it is impractical in dense networks. Indeed in large wireless networks, the use of flooding algorithms may lead to broadcast storms where the number of collisions is so large that it causes system failure. To prevent broadcast storms, many mechanisms that reduce redundant transmissions have been proposed that reduce retransmission overhead either deterministically or probabilistically.
Introduction
Ad hoc networks are self-organizing wireless networks, absent of any fixed infrastructure [10, 18, 12] . Nodes in such networks communicate through wireless transmissions of limited range, sometimes requiring the use of intermediate nodes to reach a destination. Also, nodes are usually limited in their power supply and bandwidth. The mobility of the system further complicates the situation. Two primary issues in ad hoc network research are efficiency and security. Because of their nature and restricted resources, efficiency is essential in ad hoc networks. Also, naturally, ad hoc networks are more vulnerable to security threats than fixed, wired networks. Unfortunately, efficiency and security are competing properties, in that improving efficiency is likely to reduce security and efforts to increase security are likely to negatively impact efficiency. The security and efficiency of ad hoc networks is the focus of this paper.
Routing in ad hoc networks is an active area of research [5, 6, 17, 10, 18] . The de facto route discovery algorithm for such networks is broadcast flooding [1] [2] [3] 17] . With flooding, each node that receives a message retransmits that message exactly once. Flooding [17] has many positive properties for ad hoc networks including maximal coverage, distance preservation and redundancy. Maximal coverage means that if a time-relevant path 1 exists between a source and any destination, flooding will discover that path. Flooding will also find the shortest path between the source and destination. We call this property distance preservation. Redundancy is a positive attribute in ad hoc networks because these networks are naturally less reliable and more vulnerable than their static counterparts. Conversely, many seek to replace flooding as the ad hoc routing algorithm of choice because of its inefficiency that is directly related to its redundancy [14, 11, 19] . Indeed in dense networks, the redundancy may be catastrophic if a broadcast storm [16] is triggered.
A solution to the broadcast storm problem is to reduce message redundancy. This is the approach taken with probabilistic retransmission protocols, also referred to as gossip protocols [10, 19, 9] . Gossip is similar to flooding, with one important distinction. In gossip, when a node receives a message for the first time, rather than immediately retransmitting it as in flooding, it engages a probabilistic process to determine whether or not to retransmit. Essentially, it retransmits each message with probability p. From a security point of view, this approach may have undesirable properties. Chief among them is that malicious (Byzantine) nodes are given undue influence in the propagation process, while non-faulty nodes which adhere to the protocol may forego participation. Thus, protocols that may be highly reliable and efficient in a fair environment, will be inactive in the face of a malicious attack. In this paper we describe several subtle adaptations of gossip that, combined with other available information, can offer substantial security enhancement with improved efficiency.
A central contribution of our work is to present a model that supports the analytical argument of protocol properties, addressing both security and performance issues. This model allows us to describe the protocols in a unique way, where properties can be isolated and analyzed. In this paper, for each case, we intuitively describe the proposed protocols and exercise the model by giving mathematical proofs of the protocols' security and performance properties, rather than relying on simulations that cannot capture security properties, and where hidden assumptions can impact performance analysis.
We also note that our methods are founded on the well-understood flooding protocols, which have been extensively simulated in both wired and wireless networks, with mixed results. For example in [7] , Gavin et al. simulated performance of the simple flooding protocol using each of the three most prominent simulators (OPNET Modeler, NS-2 and GLoMoSim). They showed how each simulator achieved significant variations in results even though the assumptions were held constant. With the extensive simulation analysis that flooding and gossip protocols have undergone, there is little to be gained by further simulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our security model and malicious faults. In Section 3 we define our cell-grid, the concept of cell-to-cell propagation and connected vertex coverings. We then present two basic gossip protocols. In Section 4 we present four adaptive gossip protocols that correct propagation failures by using local neighbor information. In Section 5 we present a gossip protocol that uses directional information and in Section 6 a gossip protocol that uses cell location. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss security and efficiency issues and conclude in Section 8.
Ad hoc faults and malicious faults
There are several ways in which one can model the unpredictable nature of an ad hoc network. For a stochastic approach one may use a Bayesian model in which the status of links tends to be stable (see e.g., [4] ). With such an approach one should allow for Markov interdependencies between some links. For example, if A, B are nodes that are close to each other and are on the hop boundary of a node X, then it is more likely that the status of the links (A, X) and (B, X) will be affected in the same way. Such Bayesian models can be used to describe the stochastic aspects of the network and formulate some of the basic properties of ad hoc networks (in particular, for a formal security analysis), but are too general for simulation purposes.
Whatever model is used one must allow for malicious behavior. The traditional Byzantine threats model allows for an adversary who coordinates the malicious nodes according to some plan. The task of the adversary is to frustrate the normal operation of the network. When a link is broken we say that a fault occurs. Ad hoc faults are random faults that are caused by the mobility of the network and Nature. Such faults are typically independent, although one must allow for certain weak dependencies, e.g., links to nodes that are close to each other are more likely to brake together. Also Nature may cause faults that are dependent. However such dependencies are not part of a coordinated plan, and are usually addressed by using reliability mechanisms and intrusion detection mechanisms (for traceability). For example, in a low mobility network with only ad hoc faults, routes have a high probability of remaining connected, and when they are disconnected they can be rebuilt locally.
Malicious or Byzantine faults are caused by the adversary, and are usually strongly dependent. The adversary can be passive or active. Passive attacks are essentially eavesdropping attacks. Active attacks involve action by the adversary which can take different forms. The adversary can corrupt communicated data, fabricate data, or impersonate other nodes. In the extreme case, we may have to deal with one-time, all-out attacks such as terrorist attacks. Malicious faults affect the robustness of the network and are usually addressed by using a combination of cryptographic mechanisms and redundancy.
In this paper we are mainly concerned with malicious faults. Such faults occur when a node fails to respond to protocol calls in the prescribed way. For example, when a node X does not respond to protocol calls from a one-hop neighbor Y, thus effectively breaking the link (Y, X). Unlike ad hoc faults which may occur with a predictable frequency, malicious faults are unpredictable and cannot be addressed by using statistical analysis tools. Intrusion detection tools may also fail to detect such faults.
The cell-grid and two basic gossip protocols
Our goal in this section is to find gossip protocols that minimize redundancy while retaining some of the positive features of flooding, such as maximal coverage, minimal state retention and minimal path length delivery. We are only concerned with large dense networks for which the redundancy in flooding may cause a broadcast storm. We assume that there is generally a locally uniform node density, in particular that no parts of the network are sparse. Finally, for simplicity, we assume that all nodes of the ad hoc network have the same broadcast range: one hop. This will be our unit of measurement. We start by defining the cell-grid and show how it can be used for gossiping.
A cell-grid is a covering (or tiling) of the Euclidean plane with regular hexagons, or cells-as shown in Fig. 1 . The cells are the basis for message propagation in our gossip protocols. Our approach in general will be to have at least one node from each cell to be active and propagate the message (a gossip node), resulting in cell-to-cell propagation (although as we shall see, some cells can be silent). Thus 
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effectively we reduce node-to-node flooding to cellto-cell gossiping. To minimize the redundancy we must choose the size of each cell to be maximal subject to fade-out. Therefore, for cell-to-cell propagation, we choose the grid size so that the maximum distance between any two points of an adjacent pair of cells is no more than one hop, since in the worst case, there may only be nodes on the boundary of the cells. Let ' be the length of an edge of the regular hexagon cell in hops. The maximum distance between two adjacent cells is
as shown in Fig. 2 . Since we want this distance to be bounded by one hop, we take '
the area of a cell is:
ffiffi ffi 3 p of a hop square, which is roughly 1 5 , or 1 5p of a hop circle. 2 We will apply this observation shortly. Since one cannot control cells in which all nodes are faulty, we are only concerned with cells that have non-faulty nodes. Furthermore, we shall assume that these cells are connected, that is: Connectivity assumption: All cells with at least one non-faulty node form a connected region.
This will be our basic assumption and will be used with our gossip protocols, when dealing with network coverage issues. This is not as restrictive as it may seem: if the network is partitioned then our results still hold, but are restricted to partitions.
Connected vertex coverings of the network cell graph
Our gossip protocols promote message propagation by cell-to-cell gossiping. One way to achieve this is by ensuring that at least one node from each cell will retransmit the received message. However, as we shall see, this is a worst case solution. In general it is not necessary for all cells of the network to be gossipy. We only need to consider connected subsets whose one-hop range will cover the network.
To analyze the structure of such sets we view the set V cell of all cells with at least one non-faulty node, as the node set of a network cell graph G cell = (V cell , E cell ), whose edges (c i , c j ) 2 E cell are adjacent pairs of cells in the cell-grid. This graph may be regarded as a communication graph for the network, since we get network coverage when its cells are gossipy. A connected vertex covering (CVC) of G cell is a connected subset C cell of V cell for which at least one of the cells c i , c j of every edge (c i , c j ) 2 E cell belongs to C cell . From our discussion in Section 3 (and Fig. 2 ) it is clear that we get network coverage if, and only if, the cells of some CVC of G cell are gossipy. The number of cells of a minimal CVC of G cell ranges from approximately 1 3 
We get the former with square cell graphs and the later with linear cell graphs-see Fig. 3 . Note that the Vertex Cover problem 3 is NP-complete (for general networks).
Remark 1.
There are several advantages in using cell-based protocols and a cell-based analysis for mobile environments, the main one being that the cells are static. This is particularly relevant for dense networks. For sparse networks, a cell-based approach is inappropriate because some cells may become empty and cell-based analysis becomes suboptimal. In this paper we use a cell-based approach 2 A hop circle is the area of a circle with radius one hop. 3 Given a graph G = (V, E) and a constant K 6 jVj, is there a subset V 0 & V such that: jV 0 j 6 K and, for each edge (u, v) in E, at least one of u, v belongs to V 0 ?
to get provable (analytical) results (such as Theorems 1-6) as opposed to empirical results that are based on simulations.
Cell-based gossip
A cell is gossipy if at least one of its nodes x will retransmit a received message m. If there are c x nodes in the cell of node x, then this would be achieved, on average, if each cell node were to retransmit m with probability p = 1/c x . Since the selection of retransmitting nodes, or gossip nodes, is probabilistic, there is a probability that there will be no gossip node in a cell, i.e., the cell will be silent. This is roughly: 1 À 1 c x cx $ e À1 , for large c x . To reduce this we can use a larger message propagation probability, say p = k/c x , where k, 0 < k 6 c x , is a positive real number (since some cells can be silent, we can allow for k < 1). In this case the probability of a cell being silent is ð1 À k=c x Þ cx $ e Àk . The probability of a cell being gossipy is then roughly
Àk . We call k the propagation parameter and q(k) the gossip cell probability. The parameter k controls the tradeoff between efficiency and security. Propagation failure occurs when a connected node does not receive a transmitted message.
The easiest way to approximate c x is to assume a lower bound for the density of the network. Suppose that c min is such a bound for the density of a cell. Then if we take p = 1/c min , we should expect to get at least one gossip node per cell.
The first cell-based gossip protocol that we consider, Gossip1, was presented by Haas-Halpern-Li [11] . The input for Gossip1 is: k, c min , s, m, with k the propagation parameter, c min a lower bound for the cell density, 0 < k 6 c min , s the source and m the message.
Gossip1(k, c min ; s, m) [11] Node s broadcasts m for each node x that receives m for the first time do broadcast m with probability p = k/c min Observe that if we choose k = c min , then we have ordinary flooding.
Dynamic cell-based gossip
When the number of neighbor nodes of a node x, i.e. its degree n x , is available [11] , we can select p dynamically for each node x by computing
. Our second gossip protocol, which is a further extension of the protocol in [11] , uses this approach.
Gossip2(k;
the local node density is uniform. This protocol takes into account the local density and therefore will reduce the propagation failure in networks where density varies, or for which the given lower density bound is too low.
Definition. Let c be the number of cells of the network cell graph G cell and Bin cvc ðzÞ :¼ P 
Theorem 1.
If there are no malicious faults then the probability that we get complete coverage with Gossip1 and Gossip2 is at least:
Proof. In Gossip1 the probability that a neighbor node y of x will retransmit a message m is p = k/ c min . Assuming that the nodes are distributed at random, the probability that a neighbor node y is in the same cell as node x is 1/5p. So the probability that no neighbor node y in the cell of x will retransmit m is ð1 À p=5pÞ nx ¼ ð1 À k=5pc min Þ nx 6 e Àk (n x P 5pc min ). Therefore with probability at least q(k) = (1 À e Àk ), a cell will retransmit a received message. Since the cells of a CVC C are connected and cover G cell , we get complete network coverage with probability: q(k) jCj (1 À q(k)) cÀjCj . The proof for Gossip2 is similar, except that we replace all occurrences of c min in the proof by c x . h Estimating the probability in Theorem 1 can be quite complex even if the network cell graph is only a few hundred cells. There are several ways of approximating this probability. One way is to compute the expected coverage (reachability) of a random cell graph C confined to a given area, by approximating the summation in the probability. In Fig. 4 we illustrate this for a 5 · 5 hop square (%10 · 10 cells), with 100-250 random nodes (uniformly distributed). The y-axis shows the expected coverage (reachability) and the x-axis the cell gossip probability q(k). It can be seen that for 250 nodes: when q(k) = 0.8, the expected coverage is 90%, and when q(k) = 0.9 the expected coverage is 98%. We get similar results for larger dense graphs. For example, for a 10 · 10 hop square (%20 · 20 cells) with 1000 nodes, the expected coverage is at least 86% when q(k) P 0.8, and 94% when q(k) P 0.9. These results are confirmed empirically by using ad hoc network simulations [11] .
The coverage probability of Gossip1 and Gossip2 is restricted to networks with no malicious faults because of the following attack.
The silent attack: A malicious node may fail to respond to the gossip protocol. This will distort the distribution of gossip nodes, resulting in propagation failure. For example, suppose that there are f 0 faulty nodes in the cell of node x that do not respond to the protocol calls of Gossip2. Then the expected number of gossip nodes in the cell of x will be reduced by f 0 k/c min and the coverage failure of that cell raised to e Àkð1Àf 0 =c min Þ . The effect of this on the expected coverage will be to shift the graph in Fig. 4 to the right (we have to discount the silent nodes).
In Sections 5 and 6 we shall show how to deal with malicious faults.
Adaptive gossip
We next present three gossip protocols that adaptively correct probabilistic propagation failures. The first protocol avoids redundant gossips by using random broadcast delay, first presented by NiTseng-Chen-Sheu [16] . In the second protocol we assume that nodes can measure the strength of received signals. Signal strength is used to decide whether a node should retransmit the message in order to maximize coverage. In the third protocol nodes can locate the relative direction of the broadcast source. This additional information helps reduce propagation failure and network congestion while maintaining coverage. Notice that each of these approaches is essentially stateless, which is a primary feature of flooding.
A basic adaptive gossip protocol
Our first adaptive gossip variation relies on probabilistic delay to serialize message retransmissions and extends the protocols in [16, 11] . In this protocol, when a node x receives the gossip g m of a message m for the first time, it generates a wait-period, randomized within an à priori selected range, e.g., between 1 and 5 ms. The node waits during the selected period, counting the number of received gossips g m . If the counter meets a retransmission threshold before the wait-period ends, then x will not retransmit and disregard all further gossips of m. If the counter does not meet the threshold then x will retransmit m and disregard all further gossips of m.
AdaptiveGossip(k; c, m) [16] Node s broadcasts m for each node x that receives m for the first time do delay at random within the contention time if the number of received gossips of m is less than 5kp then broadcast m Theorem 2. Suppose there are no malicious faults. Then, the probability of complete coverage of AdaptiveGossip is at least Bin cvc (q(k)).
Proof. In any neighborhood of a node x, there will be at least 5kp gossip nodes (provided 5kp 6 n x ). Since we assume that the local density is uniform, the probability that a given neighbor y of x will be in the same cell as x is
. Therefore the probability that a cell is gossipy is at least
The rest is as in Theorem 1. h
The chatterbox attack: a malicious node can retransmit repeatedly the same message. This will distort the distribution of the gossip nodes (some nodes that would normally be gossipy will now be silent), resulting in propagation failure. In particular, if the hop envelope of the chatterbox nodes encloses the hop circle of the source node, the coverage is restricted to the envelope.
Both the silent attack and the chatterbox attack belong to a general family of attacks on gossip protocols in which the adversary tries to distort the distribution of the gossipy nodes to cause propagation failure.
A signal strength gossip protocol
In this protocol, signal strength information is used to estimate whether the sender and receiver are in the same cell. If this is the case then propagation is not needed. The estimation is obtained by calculating the probability that the sender is not in the receiver's cell given his signal strength. The protocol is given below.
Let g m be a received gossip of m, sigstrength(g m ) be the signal strength of g m , with value in the range [0, 1], and S 0 2 [0, 1] be a signal strength threshold.
AdaptiveSignalStrengthGossip(k, S 0 ; s, m)
Node s broadcasts m for each node x that receives m for the first time do delay at random within the contention time if the number of gossips g m of m with sigstrength(g m ) < S 0 is less than k then broadcast m
where ' is the cell radius. The probability p(x; h) that a randomly selected node with distance at most h (of a hop) from x is not in the cell of x is at most
Proof. We consider two cases: when the distance of x from its cell boundary is at most h-see Fig. 5 , and when the distance is greater than h. In the first case the probability p(x; h) is at most
In the second case, when the distance of x from its cell boundary is greater than h, we have p(x; h) = 0. Therefore overall, the probability that a randomly selected node is not in the same cell as x is at most
Þ. h Theorem 3. Let S 0 2 [0, 1] be a signal strength threshold and h 0 the distance (in hops) over which the signal strength reduces to S 0 , with h 0 6 ', the cell radius. Suppose there are no malicious faults. Then, the probability of complete coverage of AdaptiveSignalStrengthGossip is at least Bin cvc (q(kb)), y x Proof. From the protocol, for every non-gossip node x, there will be at least k gossip nodes y with distance at most h 0 from x. By Lemma 1, the probability that each such node y is not in the same cell as x is at most
In total, the probability that all these nodes y are not in the same cell as x is at most
In the following variation, we use signal strength information to estimate whether the sender and receiver are in the same cell. If this is the case then retransmission is not needed. The estimate is obtained by calculating the probability that the sender is not in the receiver's cell given his signal strength. Denote this probability by p(sigstrength(g m )). The protocol is given below.
AdaptiveVariableSignalStrengthGossip(k; s, m)
Node s broadcasts m for each node x that receives m for the first time do delay at random within the contention time let
À ln½pðsigstrengthðg m ÞÞ, where g m is any received gossip of m. if v x < k then broadcast m Theorem 4. Suppose there are no malicious faults. Then, the probability of complete coverage for AdaptiveVariableSignalStrengthGossip is at least Bin cvc (q(k)).
Proof. For each node x, the probability that a received g m was broadcast from outside the cell of x is p (sigstrength(g m )) . So the probability that no node in the cell of x retransmits the message is at most Q g m pðsigstrengthðg m ÞÞ ¼ e Àvx . Then the probability that a cell is gossipy is at least:
Remarks
With adaptive gossip protocols, nodes can make the retransmission decision non-deterministically based on local information. This allows ad hoc networks to avoid failures from broadcast storms and to significantly improve their energy efficiency. Rather than use coin flips to reduce collisions as done in classic gossip protocols [10, 19, 9] , our protocols use random contention time. Additionally, by taking advantage of signal strength, our protocols guarantee full network coverage with an exponentially small chance of failure. In the next sections, we show how to guarantee delivery.
The power of our model is illustrated when dealing with the signal strength detection error. For example, as long as we are given an upper bound E on the error, we can easily replace the signal strength used in the protocol by sigstrength(g m ) + E.
Signal direction
In the preceding section there was a small probability that propagation may fail to reach some nodes. While this may be acceptable in certain cases, for other cases, involving route discovery and broadcasting of control information, a guaranteed broadcast protocol is often desired. In this section, and in the following section, we analyze possible solutions for this problem that avoid broadcast storms. Further, our protocols are robust against malicious faults.
In our next gossip protocol we use direction information to eliminate propagation failure. We assume that each node can distinguish the direction sector from which a signal is received, by using a directional antenna. The area around a node x is divided into six sectors, 60°each-see 
Remarks
The focus of our model is to provide provable deliverability properties, even in the worst case scenario. For example, we prove that our signal direction protocol guarantees coverage in our model where directional detection is precise. This works because of our selection of six sectors which guarantees that in the worst case, received messages cover at least two sectors of area (120°of area relative to the receiving/deciding node (RDN)). Thus, in the worst possible grouping arrangement, where two transmitting nodes are side by side, but in different sectors, both at the limit of the transmission range of the RDN, their transmissions are still guaranteed to cover all of the nodes in the sector in which they reside, in addition to nodes in an area equivalent to one overlapping sector in the two adjacent sectors.
This redundancy is a natural property of our protocols. In the best case, where all six received messages originate from nodes very close to the RDN, all nodes in the RDNs transmission range will receive the message six times without retransmission by the RDN. The further away the transmitting nodes are from the RDN, the less redundancy is encountered. Still, the redundancy guarantees complete coverage by at least one retransmission even in the absolute worst case.
The power of our model is illustrated when dealing with the signal direction detection error. For example, as long as we are given an upper bound on the error, we can easily select an appropriate number of sectors that: (i) allows us to guarantee delivery even in the worst case and, (ii) is optimal in its redundancy while maintain guaranteed delivery. To illustrate this consider a scenario where the maximum signal direction error is 15°. In the six sector model, this error allows an upper bound of a worst case uncovered area of thirty degrees. If we reduce our sector angle by 7.5°(practically, we would reduce it by 8.7°to have seven equivalent sectors), we again can guarantee complete coverage even in the worst case.
Geodesic gossip
In this section, we present a geodesic-based gossip protocol. In contrast to location-aware networks [8, 15] , our protocol uses only local location information and preserves the location privacy of mobile nodes. The protocol assumes that each node x can obtain a cell identifier cid x .
AdaptiveGeodesicGossip(s, m)
Node s broadcasts (cid s , m) for each node x do delay at random within contention time if no valid gossip g m = (cid x , m) of m is received then broadcast (cid x , m) When robustness against malicious attacks is desirable, we shall require that the location cid x is obtained from a tamper-proof device attached to x (in a tamper-proof way) that authenticates the location information cid x . This requirement can be addressed by using a message authentication code. For example, cid x = MAC K (location, time), where location is the cell location and time is rounded to account for time differences and transmission time. An alternative way to obtain this cell identification information, without using a message authentication code and location sensors, is by combining signal strength and direction. In this case, gossip nodes do not broadcast their cid x . This is determined by the receiving nodes by combining the signal strength and direction.
Theorem 6. AdaptiveGeodesicGossip always succeeds.
Proof. By assumption, all cells which have at least one non-faulty node, are connected. Furthermore each cell, with at least one non-faulty node, will have at least one gossip node, since a non-faulty node will retransmit if no other node within its cell transmits. So we get complete coverage. h
Security and efficiency issues
We have considered five adaptive gossip protocols, namely: adaptive gossip, adaptive signal strength gossip, adaptive variable signal strength gossip, adaptive signal direction gossip, and adaptive geodesic gossip.
The first three protocols use redundancy to probabilistically guarantee message transmission. These have an exponentially small failure probability in the propagation parameter k, by using linear redundancy in k. The last two protocols tolerate malicious faults. For these, message delivery is guaranteed while keeping redundancy minimal.
In Fig. 7 we compare the performance of all our gossip protocols. The gossip rate is the fraction of nodes in the (one hop) neighborhood of x that retransmit (the fraction of gossip nodes). Note that the coverage probability for the first five protocols assumes no malicious faults, whereas the coverage probability of the last two protocols applies even when there are malicious faults. Finally, note that while our protocols are designed to prevent broadcast storms under reasonable circumstances, we do not consider all-out denial of service (DoS) attacks [13] in this paper. Rather, we assume that DoS is handled by choke points at the physical level.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have identified an approach for managing redundancy and security of flooding protocols in dense ad hoc networks. We have mathematically shown the negative impacts of redundancy on ad hoc network bandwidth and how the redundancy can be controlled. Specifically, we give mechanisms that allow network managers the ability to trade off redundancy and its resulting overhead, to provide delivery reliability, and we show how security issues are addressed with this controlled redundancy. Our approach is founded on the concept of cell-grid propagation. Essentially, by tiling the network area with regular hexagons, message redundancy and volume can be tuned to meet the demands for reliability and security. We give protocols to accomplish these objectives and proofs of theorems related to the security properties of those protocols. We show how density is the dominant factor in controlling redundancy in dynamic networks. Finally we note that it is possible to use other regular tilings such as triangular or square tilings, but these do not improve the tradeoff between the propagation failure and the gossip rate. Fig. 7 . A comparison of the security features (probability of getting complete coverage and robustness against Byzantine faults) and the gossip rate (the fraction of gossipy nodes over all nodes in a cell-the redundancy) of the proposed protocols compared to flooding. In this table: q(z) = (1 À e Àz ); k is the propagation parameter; c is the number of cells of the cell network; b is as in Theorem 3; n x is the number of nodes in the neighborhood of x; c min is a lower bound on for the number of nodes in a non-empty cell. 4 For cell-to-cell propagation the edge of an equilateral triangular tile must be ' = 1/2 of a hop and the density per hop circle roughly 9.2p tiles; similarly, the edge of a square tile must be ' ¼ 1=2 ffiffi ffi 2 p of a hop and the density per hop circle 8p tiles. The density of hexagonal tiles per hop circle is 5p which is less in both cases.
